How It Works
HYBRID FORMAT
The fellowship begins remotely in the fall, with a kickoff call with your mentor. Throughout the year, we will host events around upcoming research conferences.
The fellowship begins remotely in the fall, with a kickoff call with your mentor. Throughout the year, we will host events around upcoming research conferences.
FELLOWSHIP KICKOFF
During the first month, you will have a kick off call with your mentor, where you will set the frequency of your meetings and how you will use your time. By the end of this month you should have a clear plan to work towards for the duration of your Fellowship.
During the first month, you will have a kick off call with your mentor, where you will set the frequency of your meetings and how you will use your time. By the end of this month you should have a clear plan to work towards for the duration of your Fellowship.
DELIVERABLES
Deliverables at the end of the program: Either a paper or open github repo if work is ongoing, a talk at the Inaugural TLDR Conference in May 2024, a blog post that explains your work.
Deliverables at the end of the program: Either a paper or open github repo if work is ongoing, a talk at the Inaugural TLDR Conference in May 2024, a blog post that explains your work.
Fellowship Benefits
Salary
You’ll receive a $10,000-$50,000 stipend for the duration of your fellowship, giving you time to focus on your DeFi research.
Support
You will have access to a dedicated mentor who has domain expertise in the topic you’re writing on.
Network
You’ll have the opportunity to meet the cohort of fellows and council at events. In addition, you will present your research at the TLDR Conference in 2024.
Meet The Mentors
Selected for their expertise and contributions in the field, our three mentors are at the forefront of driving innovation alongside our TLDR fellows.
“Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions”
Market Microstructure for MEV, Blockchain Mechanism Design
“An Efficient Algorithm for Optimal Routing Through Constant Function Market Makers”
CFMMs, MEV, Censorship Resistance
"Time is Money: Strategic Timing Games in Proof-of-Stake Protocols"
MEV supply network, Censorship Resistance, Protocol Mechanism Design, CL and EL data
Meet the Research Council
John Adler
Director of Protocol Engineering
"Building Scalable Decentralized Payment Systems"
blockchain protocol design, incentive structures, resource pricing
Guillermo Angeris
Head of research at Bain Capital Crypto
“Improved Price Oracles: Constant Function Market Makers” and "Concave pro-rata games"
OPTIMIZATION, CFMMS, PROBABILITY
Tarun Chitra
Gauntlet, Robot Ventures
“Improved price oracles: Constant function market makers" and "Towards a theory of maximal extractable value i: Constant function market makers”
CONVEX OPTIMIZATION, CFMMS, MEV, AUCTIONS, SPIN GLASSES
Theo Diamandis
PhD student at MIT and researcher at Bain Capital Crypto
“Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets”
OPTIMIZATION, CONVEX ANALYSIS, MEV, CFMMS
Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira
Harvard Postdoctoral Fellow
“Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules”
AI, ALGORITHMIC ECONOMICS AND SECURITY
Pranav Garimidi
a16z Crypto Research
"Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World"
MEV, Auction Design, Fee Mechanisms, Algorithmic Game Theory
Assimakis Kattis (Aki)
New York University
“RedShift: Transparent SNARKs from List Polynomial Commitments”
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT, CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS AND ZKP MECHANISM DESIGN
Kshitij Kulkarni
UC Berkeley / Gauntlet
"Routing MEV in Constant Function Market Makers" and "An Analysis of Intent Based Markets"
Mechanism design, game theory, optimization
Mallesh Pai
Associate Professor, Rice University and Principal Researcher, Consensys Inc
"Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions" (with Elijah Fox and Max Resnick)
Market Microstructure for MEV, Blockchain Mechanism Design
Dan Robinson
Paradigm
"Leaderless Auctions"
MEV Auctions, L2 Sequencers, Power Perpetuals
Danning Sui
Flashbots
“Measuring the impact of hidden DEX costs”
MEV, DEX, DATA RESEARCH
John Adler
Director of Protocol Engineering
"Building Scalable Decentralized Payment Systems"
blockchain protocol design, incentive structures, resource pricing
Sarah Allen
Flashbots, IC3
“Forsage: Anatomy of a Smart-Contract Pyramid Scheme”
Governance, DAOs, voting schemes, decentralized identity, all things MEV, and empirical studies and attacks for any of the above
Guillermo Angeris
Head of research at Bain Capital Crypto
“Improved Price Oracles: Constant Function Market Makers” and "Concave pro-rata games"
OPTIMIZATION, CFMMS, PROBABILITY
Tarun Chitra
Gauntlet, Robot Ventures
“Improved price oracles: Constant function market makers" and "Towards a theory of maximal extractable value i: Constant function market makers”
CONVEX OPTIMIZATION, CFMMS, MEV, AUCTIONS, SPIN GLASSES
Theo Diamandis
PhD student at MIT and researcher at Bain Capital Crypto
“Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets”
OPTIMIZATION, CONVEX ANALYSIS, MEV, CFMMS
Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira
Harvard Postdoctoral Fellow
“Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules”
AI, ALGORITHMIC ECONOMICS AND SECURITY
Pranav Garimidi
a16z Crypto Research
"Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World"
MEV, Auction Design, Fee Mechanisms, Algorithmic Game Theory
Assimakis Kattis (Aki)
New York University
“RedShift: Transparent SNARKs from List Polynomial Commitments”
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT, CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS AND ZKP MECHANISM DESIGN
Ariah Klages-Mundt
Superluminal Labs
“While Stability Lasts: A Stochastic Model of Non-Custodial Stablecoins”
Design and analysis of DeFi mechanisms (including stablecoins, AMMs, oracles, governance systems), modeling economic security, modeling risk and contagion in DeFi protocols
Kshitij Kulkarni
UC Berkeley / Gauntlet
"Routing MEV in Constant Function Market Makers" and "An Analysis of Intent Based Markets"
Mechanism design, game theory, optimization
Jason Milionis
Columbia University
“A Myersonian Framework for Optimal Liquidity Provision in Automated Market Makers”
decentralized mechanism design, game dynamics, auction design, algorithmic game theory
Mallesh Pai
Associate Professor, Rice University and Principal Researcher, Consensys Inc
"Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions" (with Elijah Fox and Max Resnick)
MEV Auctions, new defi implementations
Dan Robinson
Paradigm
"Leaderless Auctions"
MEV Auctions, L2 Sequencers, Power Perpetuals
Raphaela Sapire
Uniswap Foundation
MEV + Oracle research implemented as hooks on Uniswap v4, Flashloan/sandwich auctions, Routers, Incentive Design
Danning Sui
Flashbots
“Measuring the impact of hidden DEX costs”
MEV, DEX, DATA RESEARCH
Request For Proposals
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Past Fellows
After reviewing 107 applicants, 10 outstanding researchers were selected for the first round of TLDR fellowships.
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Mohammadreza Ahmadnejadsaein
Governance decentralization game theory
Cornell University
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Ghada Almashaqbeh
pricing state growth
University of Connecticut
Andrés Fábrega
Governance decentralization game theory
Cornell University
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Yotam Gafni
improved mev auctions
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
Ruizhe Jia
block bidding ecomonics on mev-boost
Columbia University
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Lily Johnson
implementation of defi mechanisms
Independent Security Researcher
krane
implementation of defi mechanisms
Independent Researcher
Kaihua Qin
implementation of defi mechanisms
Imperial College London
Itamar Reif
zk fee mechanism design
Astria
Burak Öz
block bidding ecomonics on mev-boost
Technical University of Munich